Battle of Gaixia

The Battle of Gaixia was a battle in 202 BC, during the Chu-Han contention between rival rulers of China which followed the collapse of the Qin Dynasty. The battle resulted in victory for the forces led by Liu Bang, who was later to become Emperor of China, over their opponents.

Background

The Han forces had earned many major victory against Chu, but they still did not control most of the country. Most of eastern China was still under Chu control. Eventually Xiang Yu was able to reorganize his forces, and strike back at Liu Bang.



At this point, major disagreements had occurred between Liu Bang and Han Xin. The primary reasons were because Liu Bang refused to gave Han Xin too much control over the Han army, and his refusal to use many of Han Xin's suggestions. As a result, Han Xin withheld his forces in Qi as Liu Bang was under siege from Xiang Yu. Liu Bang was only able to hang on because of the assistance from another excellent military strategist Zhang Liang.



Xiang Yu was one of the best warrior-commanders in Chinese history, but in most battles he rarely paid sufficient attention to resource logistics. In this battle, Zhang Liang was successful in assaulting Xiang Yu's supply lines, which Xiang Yu did not care much about, and this greatly hurt the Chu army's effectiveness. On the other hand, Zhang Liang was successful in keeping the Han supply lines open. During a conversation, Xiang Yu's archer hit Liu Bang with an arrow, which wounded his lung. However, Liu Bang was able to hide this fact from his own army and Xiang Yu, hence keeping the morale of the Han troops high.



Xiang Yu then threatened to kill Liu Bang's captured father and wife and have them cooked over fire, to force Liu Bang to surrender. Liu Bang simply replied that since the two had being named 'brothers' he would be effectively cooking his own father, and that Xiang Yu should not forget to send him a cup of 'their' father's flesh to share as good brothers, but Xiang Yu still did not kill them. At one point, Xiang Yu was about to capture Liu Bang. Finally, Liu Bang agreed with everything that Han Xin requested, and Han Xin finally agreed to help. Later, with the arrival of Han Xin, Liu Bang was able to convince Xiang Yu to a peace treaty. At the end, both parties agreed that the two countries of Han and Chu can co-exist peacefully. Liu Bang 's father and wife was returned to Liu Bang. Then, in October 202 BC, Xiang Yu started to move his forces back east.

The battle

Unknown to Xiang Yu, this was a tactic from Han Xin. The Chu forces had sieged the Han fortress for a long time, leaving them tired. On top of that, Chu troops were getting less food than they needed to fight effectively. When news reached them that the war was over, and that there would be long term peace ahead, they were overjoyed.



Han Xin then lead many attacks against the joyful Chu forces. In anger, Xiang Yu tried to fight his way back to Liu Bang's fortress, but Han Xin had set up many traps and ambushes along the way. Finally Xiang Yu decided that a quick victory was no longer possible, with his low morale troops, and decided to temporarily retreat back to the Chu capital, and regroup there.



Han Xin knew that he could not let Xiang Yu return to the capital. Han Xin ordered his forces to increase the amount of ambushes, in order to force the Chu troops into a canyon area near Gaixia, where Xiang Yu could not move at will. As the ambushes increased, Xiang Yu, an excellent strategist, became more and more certain that the main traps would await him inside the canyon. So although his troops were constantly ambushed, he insisted that his troops head straight back to the capital city though the main road as fast as they could, avoiding the side paths though the canyon.



Unfortunately for Xiang Yu, the fortune turned against him, despite his military genius. In one of the ambushes, Xiang Yu's beloved wife Yuji, who always traveled with his forces, was captured by Han troops . Han Xin immediately ordered that she be taken into the canyon. Xiang Yu, without a choice, sent most of his tired forces back to the capital on the main road, while he himself led a smaller force of 100,000 soldiers into the canyon to save his wife.

The trap

It was Xiang Yu's hope that, he would be able to save his wife quickly, and get out before getting totally entrapped. Unfortunately, the Han forces, under Han Xin's orders, moved his wife deep into the canyon. By the time he finally reached them and saved his wife, he and his army were already too deep into the canyon to retreat safely.



Han Xin then proceeded with his master plan: "Ambush from Ten Sides" . Han Xin first fought Xiang Yu face to face, and then retreated. Xiang Yu immediately gave chase, but soon found himself trapped among the numerous Han army. Everywhere Xiang Yu led his forces, there were ambushes and traps waiting for them. These not only caused heavy casualty for Chu, but also crushed the Chu army's morale, since escaping alive seemed impossible. The troops were trapped in the canyon until Dec 202 BC.



To further break the Chu army's spirit, Han Xin employed the "Chu Song from Four Sides" tactic. He ordered the Han soldiers and captured Chu troops to sing Chu songs. The Chu songs made the Chu troops remember their families back home, greatly reducing their will to fight. Even Xiang Yu himself thought that the whole Chu had been conquered, while he was trapped here.



Then the Chu soldiers started to leave their camps and escape on their own. Initially Xiang Yu tried, with force, to stop his troops from leaving the ranks. But when the soldiers and his wife beg of him to let the soldiers go home, Xiang Yu sadly agreed. On the same night, Xiang Yu's wife, at age 16, committed suicide, because she considered herself the primary cause of the fall of the Western Chu . This event broke even Xiang Yu's spirit.



About 800 loyal soldiers left behind and stayed with Xiang Yu, swearing to fight for him till the very end. Xiang Yu was impressed with their loyalty, and promised to lead them to safety.

Xiang Yu commits suicide

Han Xin successfully broke the spirits of the Chu troops, and that broke the Chu ranks, without a fight, as he expected. But the event had an advantage to Xiang Yu. When the Chu army size was still large, they cannot move as they wanted, since they were easy to spot. But now Xiang Yu only had 800 men on horses, which allowed him to move much more easily. Xiang Yu was able to break though the traps and ambushes, and escaped the canyon with about a hundred men.



Eventually, Han Xin discovered in shock, that Xiang Yu had escaped from the entrapped cannon. Upon discovering this, Liu Bang ordered 5,000 elite cavalry to chase down Xiang Yu. Liu Bang ordered the cavalry to not kill Xiang Yu, but capture him.



Unfortunately for Xiang Yu, after he left the canyon, he soon got lost. He tried to ask local people for directions back to Chu, but they pointed him to the wrong direction, maybe intentionally because they were loyal toward Han. Xiang Yu then went into the swamps. This cost him valuable time for escape. At the end, the elite cavalry chased him to Wu River. When Xiang Yu refused to surrender, his loyal men were slaughtered to the last man, trying to buy Xiang Yu some time to escape. Xiang Yu had an opportunaty to use a local boatsman to escape across the river back into Chu territory, but he did not have the face to do so. Instead, after making a last stand against the soldiers that attempted to capture him alive, and he himself seriously wounded, he slit his own throat.

Aftermath

The loss of Xiang Yu was a major blow to Western Chu. Xiang Yu 's brother tried to take command over Chu, but he was mostly a fighter and not a military strategist. No one else in Chu had the army leading ability of Xiang Yu, and hence no one can win any battles against Han Xin and Zhang Liang. Soon, Chu fortresses started to surrender to , and Liu Bang treated all surrendering Chu forces with respect. Had Xiang Yu successfully retreated back into Chu, Chu might had been able to stop Han 's advance, at least for a while.



Soon after the death of Xiang Yu, Chu would fall to Han, and the Han Dynasty, one of the greatest Chinese dynasties, was established.

Debates

*Liu Bang first signed a peace treaty with Xiang Yu, and then ambushed Xiang Yu when he was making his way back to Chu. As a result, many people considered Liu Bang a deceitful man. But it was also possible that Han Xin forced Liu Bang to ignore the peace treaty, as part of the deal for him to help Liu Bang. Han Xin had long wanted to defeat Xiang Yu in a decisive battle, as to prove that he was the better strategist. Before the battle, Han Xin 's Qi turned down Xiang Yu 's offer of an alliance, probably for the same reason. It seemed unlikely that Xiang Yu, being an intelligent man, would have accepted the peace treaty in the first place, if Liu Bang was such a dishonest man.



*Another debatable part of this story was Xiang Yu going into the canyon to save his wife, even though he knew it was a trap. In the military point of view, this was a horrible decision. In another view, Xiang Yu shown that he loved his wife much more than his empire.



*It was possible that, the popular game Xiangqi was invented by Xiang Yu at the time of the peace treaty. The story said that, Xiangqi was made, so that all future battles between Chu and Han can be fought over this game, hence no further human life losses needed to be suffered by neither side. In another version of the story, Liu Bang invented Xiangqi, not Xiang Yu. Also, the line that divides the board into 2 parts is marked "Chu River" on the black side and "Han Border" on the red side. There is no historical evidence for this mouth to mouth story.

Southern Jiangsu Campaign

Southern Jiangsu Campaign was a series battle fought at the Southern Jiangsu and adjacent regions in Anhui and northern Zhejiang, and it was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II with their Japanese ally. The battle was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era, and resulted in victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.



However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.



For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Order of battle

Nationalist

*3rd Division

*Other units

*Japanese troops

Communist

*1st Column of the communist Jiangsu – Zhejiang Military Region

Campaign

On September 8, 1945, the 1st Column of the communist Jiangsu – Zhejiang Military Region decided to take controls of regions in central Jiangsu, northern Zhejiang and adjacent regions in Anhui by force after the local defenders consisted of Japanese troops and former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II refused to surrender. Since mid August, 1945, over a dozen enemy strongholds in the region from Jurong County in Jiangsu in the north to Changxing Countyin Zhejiang in the south had fallen into the communist hands, including those at Front Horse , Southern Crossing , Celestial King Temple , Baonian and Jiapu regions.



On August 14, 1945, the 8th Regiment of the 3rd Division of the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force totaling over 1,200 ventured out Jurong in an attempt to counterattack, and they were assisted by two companies of Japanese troops. The 1st Regiment of the 1st Column of the communist Jiangsu – Zhejiang Military Region ambushed the enemy at Zhang Family’s Hills , and Duan Family’s Bridge regions, and after an eleven-hour long fight, succeeded in killing over 30 Japanese troops and over 370 nationalist troops, including the regimental commander of the nationalist 8th Regiment of the 3rd Division. One Japanese troops and over 350 nationalist troops were also captured alive by the communist troops.



On August 19, 1945, the 1st Column of the communist Jiangsu – Zhejiang Military Region attacked Jintan and Liyang, and annihilated the defenders consisted of a detachment of Japanese troops and two regiments of former s turned Japanese puppet regime force in the process. Over 1,700 nationalist troops were captured alive by the attacking communists. Four artillery pieces and 48 machine guns also fell into communist hands. Taking advantage of their gains, communists took towns of Lishui , Gaochun , and towns of Eastern Hill), River Ripe of Jiangning County, threatened the suburb of Nanjing. On August 24, 1945, Ji'an fell into communist hands, and on August 25, 1945, Langxi County fell into the communist hands. The campaign finally concluded on August 28, 1945 when Guangde County fell into communist hands.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist government.

Shuangduiji Campaign

Shuangduiji Campaign was a major campaign fought between the and the during the Chinese Civil War in the post-World War II era and resulted in communist victory. The campaign was part of Huaihai Campaign.

Strategies

After Nianzhuangwei Campaign in which the nationalist Huang Baitao Corps was completely annihilated, the communists were divided on deciding the next target. After fierce debate, it was finally decided on November 22, 1948 that the next target should be the nationalist Huang Wei Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Huang Wei . A total of 7 columns of the communist Central China Field Army and 2 columns of the communist Eastern China Field Army would be tasked to annihilate the nationalist Huang Wei Corps in the region to the south of Kuai River, while the main force of the communist Eastern China Field Army would be tasked to prevent any nationalist troops in Xuzhou and Bangbu from reinforce the nationalist Huang Wei Corps.



The nationalists, on the other hand, had much more solid objective of reestablish the communication / transportation line between Xuzhou and Bangbu by eradicating the enemy force in the region. To achieve so, the nationalists would launch a pincer movement from both south and north, with Qiu Qingquan Corps and Sun Yuanliang Corps in the north, and Li Yannian Corps and Huang Wei Corps in the south, with Huang Wei Corps would be attacking toward Xiu County from Mengcheng.

Order of Battle

Nationalists

* Huang Wei Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Huang Wei

**10th Army

**14th Army

**18th Army

**85th Army

Communists

*Central China Field Army commanded by Liu Bocheng

**1st Column

**2nd Column

**3rd Column

**4th Column

**6th Column

**9th Column

**11th Column

*Eastern China Field Army commanded by Su Yu

**3rd Column

**7th Column

**13th Column

**Artillery units

*Independent Brigade of the Hubei – Anhui – Jiangsu Military District

*12th Brigade of the Southern Shaanxi Military District

Initial deployment

On November 23, 1948, the nationalist Huang Wei Corps begun its attack on Nanping Village on the southern bank of Kuai River by deploying the 10th Army to the left, the 14th Army to the right, the 18th Army in the center and the 85th Army behind the 18th Army. The 4th Column of the communist Central China Field Army engaged the advancing nationalists, retreating gradually to lure the nationalists toward the communist trap by eventually abandoning Nanping Village in the evening of November 23, 1948. In the morning of November 24, 1948, the nationalist Huang Wei Corps crossed Kuai River, and entered the trap communists had setup in the regions of Dongpine Village , Ren Family’s Village , Seven Miles Bridge, , Red Mouth . Realizing that his forces was trapped, Lieutenant General Huang Wei ordered his troops to retreat southward, and planned to join another nationalist corps commanded by Lieutenant General Li Yannian in Hu’s Ditch Village and Solid Town by traveling along the southern shore of Kuai River. Once the two nationalist corps had joined together, they would travel northward along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway.



At the dusk of November 24, 1948, the communists launched their full scale attack in three fronts. In the western front, the 3rd Column of the communist Central China Field Army attacked from Sunding Village , the 1st Column of the communist Central China Field Army attacked from Five Ditch Village , the 2nd Column of the communist Central China Field Army attacked from White Sand Village , and the 6th Column of the communist Central China Field Army attacked from Cao’s Market Village . In the eastern front, the 11th Column of the communist Central China Field Army attacked from Jin County Village . In the northern front, the 4th Column of the communist Central China Field Army attacked from the region of Wu Family’s Lake , and the 9th Column of the communist Central China Field Army attacked from the region of Shao’s House with Roof Tiles . By the early morning of November 25, 1948, the nationalist Huang Wei Corps was surrounded in a 7.5 km wide region centered at Shuangdui Village .

Breakout attempt

On November 26, 1948, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek gave the permission to breakout toward southeast before the enemy’s encirclement fully enclosed. Lieutenant General Huang Wei ordered four divisions, the 11th Division and the 118th Division of the nationalist 18th Army, the 18th Division of the nationalist 10th Army and the 110th Division of the nationalist 85th Army, to attack the enemy position held by the communist 12th Brigade of the Southern Shaanxi Military District and the 6th Column of communist Central China Field Army. Despite supported by tanks and air cover, the nationalists were repeatedly beaten back by the stubborn enemy resistance.



The commander of the 110th Division of the nationalist 85th Army, Major General Liao Yunzhou suggested to Lieutenant General Huang Wei that four divisions going together would create too big a target that was obvious for the enemy to converge on. Since the enemy had not mustered enough force to complete the encirclement and must deploy their force as mobile strike force, it would be unlikely for the enemy to bother to stop smaller nationalist force attempting to breakout. Therefore, the breakout attempt should be led by a single division instead so that the enemy would be fooled into believing such breakout was only attempted by a small unit as a decoy, and would not bother to waste their strength, saving their efforts to stop the perceived large scale breakout attempt. Once the single division had slipped through the opening, other units would follow, and when the enemy had finally realized the consecutive attempts of smaller nationalist forces were in fact, the breakdown of a larger attempt, hopefully it would be probably too late and most of the nationalists would have been succeeded in breaking out.



Facing with previous setbacks, Lieutenant General Huang Wei felt that Major General Liao Yunzhou ’s suggestion appeared to be worth a try and gave the go-ahead, and Major General Liao Yunzhou volunteered to lead his 110th Division of the nationalist 85th Army as the vanguard of such attempt. However, unbeknown to Lieutenant General Huang Wei , Major General Liao Yunzhou was actually a communist spy, and let his 110th Division of the nationalist 85th Army to defect to the communist side after the latter allowed his division to pass through safely. Witnessing what they believed to be the successful breakthrough, other nationalist divisions followed, but they were immediately ambushed by the waiting enemy and were forced to turn back.

Redeployment

After the failed attempt to breakout, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ordered Lieutenant General Huang Wei to hold his position and wait for reinforcement. Lieutenant General Huang Wei made the following new plans to consolidate his positions: the nationalist 18th Army was deployed to guard the regions of Gudui and Jiangu , the nationalist 85th Army was deployed in the west to guard the region from Waist Size to Li’s Village , the nationalist 14th Army was deployed in the east to guard the regions of Zhanweizi and Yangsimazi , and the nationalist 10th Army was deployed in the south to guard the region from Maweizi to Yang’s Village and Li Village . Lieutenant General Huang Wei ’s corps headquarter was setup in Little Horse Village to the north of Shuangdui Village .



To counter the nationalist defense tactic that depended on bunkers and other fortifications, the communists adopted what themselves called “Bunkers to bunkers and trenches to trenches” tactic to breach the nationalist defense: the communists would built their own bunkers and trenches to protect themselves as they approach the nationalist positions and fight the defenders in close-quarter combats. By the early December, 1948, the nationalist defense sector was further shrunk, and with the exception of only seven or eight regiments that were still capable of fighting a mobile warfare, all other nationalist units were only capable of static defense.

The End

At 4:30 PM on December 6, 1948, the communist Central China Field Army launched its final assault on the besieged nationalists in three fronts: the eastern front was consisted of the 4th Column, the 9th Column, and the 11th Column of communist Central China Field Army, augmented by most of the artillery units of communist Eastern China Field Army and the Independent Brigade of communist Hubei – Anhui – Jiangsu Military District. The western front was consisted of the 1st Column and the 3rd Column of the communist Central China Field Army, augmented by the 13th Column and the remaining artillery units of communist Eastern China Field Army. The southern front was consisted of the 6th Column of communist Central China Field Army, augmented by the 7th Column communist Eastern China Field Army and the 12th Brigade of communist Southern Shaanxi Military District. The fighting was extremely brutal and bloody and communists were able to gradually gaining more ground.



By December 13, 1948, nationalist force under the command of Lieutenant General Huang Wei only held a small area of 1.5 km across. Liu Bocheng and issued an ultimatum to Lieutenant General Huang Wei , ordering his immediate surrender, but Lieutenant General Huang Wei refused and organized the last but futile attempt to breakout. The nationalists put a gallant fight which was not expected by their enemy, and as result, the communists had to reinforce their southern front by deploying additional troops of the 3rd Column and 13th Column of the communist Eastern China Field Army. However, the end was inevitable and luck was not on the nationalist side: as Lieutenant General Huang Wei attempted to breakout, his tank broke down and he was captured alive by his communist enemy, and his corps was totally annihilated at the dusk on December 15, 1948.

Outcome

The communist victory of Shuangduiji Campaign further ensured their victory of Huaihai Campaign, and the victory at Shuangdui Village resulted in killing more than 46,000 nationalists, and capturing over 50,000, including the nationalist Lieutenant General Huang Wei , the nationalist commander-in-chief of Huang Wei Corps. A huge quantity of hardware was also captured by the communists, including 870 pieces of artillery, 15 tanks, and over 300 motor vehicles, and large amounts of munitions, all of which were immediately used against their former nationalist owners. The communists suffered 36,000 casualties, with the 4th Column of the Central China suffering the most casualties: 6,827 wounded and 1,853 killed.



The campaign had a very significant for the communists, particularly the communist Central China Field Army which faced absolute technical inferiority due to the lack of artillery and other heavy weapons, and the communist victory of Shuangduiji Campaign not only annihilated a significant portion of nationalist troops deployed in Huaihai Campaign, thus ensuring final victory, but also provided the communist Central China Field Army with much needed heavy weapons.

New Fourth Army Incident

The New Fourth Army Incident , also known as the Incident , occurred during the Second Sino-Japanese War, during which the Chinese Civil War was in theory suspended, uniting the s and s against the Japanese. It is significant as the end of real cooperation between the Nationalists and Communists.



Today, and historians view the New Fourth Army Incident differently. From the ROC point of view it was punishment of Communist insubordination; from the PRC view it was Nationalist treachery.

Causes

ROC viewpoint

In the fall of 1940, the Communist New Fourth Army attacked Nationalist forces under Han Deqin. However, Benton's book ''New Fourth Army'' argues the Communist attack was a counterattack, a response to an initial attack by Han Deqin, and that this initial attack was the result of 's goading and harassment of Nationalist forces. Regardless, the conflict led to heavy losses for the Nationalists.

PRC viewpoint

For PRC historians the incident began in December 1940, when Chiang Kai-shek ordered Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to withdraw from Anhui and Jiangsu in a month. The Communist Party agreed to move the New Fourth Army troops in Southern Anhui to the northern shore of the Yangtze River. On January 4, the 9000-strong troops started to move from Yunling Township of Jing County towards Jiangsu, planning to cross the river in three routes.

Ambush

On January 5, they were surrounded in Maolin Township by a Nationalist force of 80,000 led by Shangguan Yunxiang and attacked days later. After days of fighting, heavy losses — including many civilian workers who staffed the army's political headquarters — were inflicted on the New Fourth Army due to the overwhelming numbers. On January 13, Ye Ting, wanting to save his men, went to Shangguan Yunxiang's headquarters to negotiate the terms. Upon arrival, Ye was detained. The New Fourth Army's political chief of staff Xiang Ying was killed, and only 2,000 people, led by Huang Huoxing and Fu Qiutao, were able to break through.

Aftermath

Chiang Kai-shek ordered the New Fourth Army disbanded on January 17, and sent Ye Ting to a military tribunal. However, on January 20, the Chinese Communist Party in Yan'an ordered the reorganization of the army. was the new army commander. Liu Shaoqi was the political commissar. The new headquarters was in Jiangsu, which was the general headquarters for the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army. Together, they comprised seven divisions and one independent brigade, totalling over ninety thousand troops.



Because of this incident, the Nationalist Party of China was criticized for creating internal strife when the Chinese were supposed to be united against the Japanese; the Communist Party of China, on the other hand, was seen as heroes at the vanguard of the fight against the Japanese and Nationalist treachery. Although as a result of this incident, the Communist Party lost possession of the lands south of Changjiang, but it drew the party support from the population, which strengthened their foundations north of Changjiang.



The novelist Mao Dun's story ''Fushi'' is about this incident.

Huai Army

The Huai Army was a Qing Dynasty military force raised to contain the Taiping Rebellion, in 1862 and restore the stability of the Qing Dynasty. Unlike the traditional Green Standard or Banner forces of the Qing, the Huai Army was largely a militia army, based on personal rather than institutional loyalties. It was armed with a mixture of traditional and modern weapons.Li Hongzhang led a part of the Xiang Army, but in 1858 Li created the Huai Army.

Main leaders

*Li Hongzhang

*Cheng Xuechi

*Liu Mingchuan

*Guo Songlin

*Yuan Jiasan

Vice leaders

*Yuan Shikai

*Zhang Shusheng

*Zhang Shushang

*Pan Dingxin

Battle of Yongjiazhen

The battle of Yongjiazhen was a battle fought at the Yong Family’s Town region in central Anhui, and it was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II and their Japanese ally. The battle was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era, and resulted in victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.



However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.



For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Order of battle

Nationalist

*2 Battalions of the 4th Division

*1 Battalion of County Self Defense Regiment

*1 Regiment and 1 battalion of the 2nd Division

Communist

*7th Column of the New Fourth Army

*19th Brigade

*1 Independent Regiment

Battle

On August 16, 1945, the communist decided to take Yong Family’s Town in eastern Anhui by force after two battalions of the 4th nationalist Division and their Japanese ally defending the town refused to surrender. The 55th Regiment and the 56th Regiment of the communist 19th Brigade assisted by the communist 7th Column launched their assault on the town at dawn on August 16, 1945 and by dusk, the town had fallen into the communist hands. The defenders suffered over 900 casualties, and the communists also captured 3 machine guns, 1 60mm mortar, and over 100 firearms.



On August 19, 1945, the communist 19th Brigade assisted by the communist Independent Regiment launched their assault on the town of Yuncao of Hanshan County to the west of Yong Family’s Town , guarded by a regiment and a battalion of the nationalist 2nd Division. After taking the town, the communists had also beaten back a battalion of nationalist reinforcement. This second battle cost the nationalists over 1,300 fatalities, and another 21 Japanese fatalities. 98 nationalist troops were captured by the communist along with 21 Japanese troops, and the attacking communists also captured 3 artillery pieces, 6 heavy machine guns, over 20 light machine guns, and over 700 rifles.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist government.

Battle of Wuhe

The battle of Wuhe was a battle fought at the Five Rivers region in eastern Anhui was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II. The battle was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.



However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.



For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Battle

On August 24, 1945, the 4th of the New Fourth Army attacked the city of Five Rivers in the eastern Anhui after the local defenders refused to surrender. The former turned Japanese puppet regime forces who rejoined in the after World War II proved to be absolutely no match for the attacking enemy, and the entire garrison consisted of five companies were lost with over 500 being captured alive by the attacking enemy. In addition, the enemy also succeeded in capturing eight light machine guns and over four hundred repeating rifles.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.



The communists did not have the dilemmas faced by the s and enjoyed popular support, and thus was able to easily overwhelm their adversary, and thus achieving victory without much difficulty, further threatening Bangbu . Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, the political gain was much greater than the military one for the communists as result of this battle.

Battle of Shicun

The battle of Shicun was a battle fought at the Time Village of Xiu County in Anhui, and it was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II. The battle was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.



However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.



For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Battle

In October, 1945, the communist decided to take Time Village of Xiu County in Anhui by force after the local defenders consisted of former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II refused to surrender. However, the defenders consisted of a division was able to successfully fend off the initial communist attacks by relying on their strong fortifications. The communists change their tactic and the 34th Regiment of the 12th Brigade of the 4th Division of the communist New Fourth Army launched its attack on the village at night, breaching the defense. After fierce street battle, the defenders were forced to flee and the village had fallen into the communist hands. The communists inflicted over 2,000 casualties on the defenders, including capturing the nationalist commander Hu Zepu alive, and in addition, they had also captured over 1,000 firearms. The attacking communists suffered over 200 casualties.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist government.

Battle of Sanhe

The Battle of Sanhe was a major engagement of the Taiping Rebellion, occurring in 1858. During this battle, the crack troops of Zeng Guofan’s Hunan Army was lost, along with one of its most capable commanders, Li Xubin.

Prelude

In August, 1858, took Luzhou , and Imperial governor of Hunan-Guangdong Guam Wing ordered Li Xubin to counter attack by taking cities / towns of Tongcheng, , and Taihu . Imperial Jiangning General Du Xing’a and Li Xubin consequently led over ten thousands troops consequently attacked Anhui from Hubei. On September 22, 1858, imperial troops took Taihu . Afterward, Li Xubin led eight thousand troops to continue the attack northward. On September 27, 1858, Li Xubin’s imperial army took , on October 13, 1858, imperial force took Tongcheng, and on October 24, 1858, imperial army took . After leaving behind two thousand troops to guard the newly conquered towns, on November 3, 1858, Li Xubin led the remaining six thousand imperial troops to the outskirt of Sanhe Town , around 25 km southeast of .



Sanhe Town was located on the western shore of Lake Chao, and an important barrier of Luzhou and also an important transportation hub to supply provisions for both and Luzhou and Nanjing. Originally lacked any city wall, the Taiping Army constructed a new wall and in addition, built a total of nine forts outside the newly built city wall. The Taiping commander in charge of defending Sanhe Town was Wu Dinggui . On October 24, 1858, Chen Yucheng had just succeeded in taking Liuhe and received the news that Sanhe Town was besieged by the imperial troops. Realizing the importance of the town, Chen Yucheng decided to reinforce Sanhe and asked Hong Xiuquan to send Li Xiucheng to strengthen the Taiping reinforcement force. Chen’s request was granted. Nearby regions‘s Nien Rebellion to send 40,000 troops to strengthen the Taiping reinforcement force,too.

Battle

On November 7, 1858, imperial troops attacked Taiping army’s forts in three fronts:

*6 battalions attacked Taiping forts in the regions of Henan Boulevard and Mouse Trap

*3 battalions attacked Taiping forts in the region of Water Buddhist nunnery and Crystal Buddhist nunnery

*2 battalions attacked Taiping forts in the region of Zhujiayue

*2 battalions personally led by Li Xubin acted as reserve of the attacking forces.

After heavy casualties on both sides, Taiping army abandoned all nine forts and retreated to the safety behind the city wall. On November 7, 1858, Chen Yucheng’s force reached Sanhe and camped in Golden Ox Town, just south of Sanhe Town. A week later, Li Xiucheng’s force also reached Sanhe Town, and camped in the region of White Stone Mountain . The Taiping army in Sanhe region totaled more than 100,000 and Li Xubin’s staff officers suggest that the imperial force must withdraw to Tongcheng temporarily since there were only six thousand of them. Li Xubin refused and subsequently moved all of his forces into the newly taken forts to take defensive positions.



Realizing the enemy had numerical superiority and he could not hold out for long, Li Xubin decided to launch a preemptive strike against Chen Yucheng’s force. At the night of November 15, 1858, seven battalions of imperial force were sent to attack Taiping army at Golden Ox Town under the cover of darkness, but unbeknown to the imperial troops, Taiping army had already laid an ambush for them. On the dawn on November 16, 1858, the imperial army clashed head on with the vanguard of Chen Yucheng’s Taiping army, which lured the entire seven battalions of imperial army into the pre-laid ambush. Chen Yucheng’s force ambushed and killed half of the seven battalions of the imperial force, and surrounded the remainders. Li Xubin sent out another four battalion for the rescue and personally led several dozen charges against the Taiping army positions, but all were beaten back with heavy loss.



Taiping army under Li Xiucheng’s command went out to support Chen Yucheng and Wu Dinggui ’s Taiping army behind the city wall also went out of the town to attack imperial army. Li Xubin had to retreat back to the forts with surviving imperial troops and attempted to hold their position and wait for reinforcement but 15,000 Green Standard Army delay never show. However, the imperial army was severely weakened and seven out of nine forts fell in short time, with the fort where Li Xubin’s headquarter was located also besieged. As Li Xubin attempted to breakout, he was killed in the fierce battle,Zeng Guofan’s first younger brother Zeng Guofar was also killed, both Li and Zeng missed their bodys, and by November 18, 1858, the battle ended when the last resistance stopped.

Aftermath

After their victory at Sanhe, Chen Yucheng and Li Xiucheng continued their offensive southward, and imperial army had to abandon and withdrew to Tongcheng, but on November 24, 1858, Li’s and Chen’s Taiping troops took Tongcheng. Imperial force under the command of Jiangning General Du Xing’a besieging Anqing was risking being cutting off from behind, and the siege had to be abandoned on November 27, 1858 and the imperial army withdrew to Xiusong via Shipai . Taiping army subsequently retook and Taihu .

Outcome

The imperial defeat at Sanhe was a major setback, not only the newly conquered towns were lost again, the siege of Anqing was also crushed. In addition, the Taiping army also expanded their territory as the result of its victory. The six thousand strong imperial force was the crack troop, whose loss would take long time to recover and thus would have severe impact on future operations against Taiping army.

Battle of Lingbi

The battle of Lingbi was a battle fought at the Lingbi region in Anhui, and it was a clash between the communists and the former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II. The battle was one of the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post World War II era, and resulted in victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the s.



However, it must be noted that most of these former s turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were s in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After the World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined s, because such move would alienate other factions within the ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the s to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the s would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.



For the former turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these s and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These s and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those s who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these s and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime.

Communist Strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the s because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the . The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Battle

By the end of August, 1945, communist New Fourth Army and other local troop units had surrounded the town of Lingbi of Anhui Province. The communist decided to take Lingbi in Anhui by force after the local defenders consisted of former s turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the s after World War II refused to surrender. In early September, 1945, a 700 strong reinforcement was sent from nearby Solid Town in attempt to help the besieged defenders, but the reinforcement was beaten back by the communists. At the night of September 4, 1945, the communists launched their general assault against the town and after six hours of fierce battle, the town was firmly in communist hands. The communists had managed to kill 104 enemy troops, and captured another 1,244, including the commander Zhao Shusen . In addition, the poorly equipped communists also captured one mortar, 8 machine guns, 1,355 rifles. The communist victory also resulted in joining their bases in one by eliminating all enemy strongholds in the region.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the s in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist government.

Battle of Houmajia

The Battle of Houmajia was a battle fought between the s and the communists in the Houmajia region of Lingbi County of Anhui, China during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era, and resulted in a communist victory.

Prelude

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict also emerged from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his nationalist regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists, who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China, to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus control the Japanese-occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and to keep their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the nationalist troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the nationalists.



However, it must be noted that most of these former nationalists turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of who were only nominally under Chiang Kai-shek before World War II, since they were nationalists in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These warlords were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the nationalist camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Oblivion, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined the nationalists, because such move would alienate other factions within the nationalist ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the nationalists to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to takeover. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his nationalist regime later on, as shown in this conflict.

Nationalist strategy

In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the nationalists would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control.



For the former nationalist turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these warlords and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These warlords and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those nationalists who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these warlords would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these warlords and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime.

Communist strategy

The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the nationalists because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the nationalists. The communists had already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the nationalists withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where a better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese-occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders.

Battle

On October 18, 1945, the 4th of the communist New Fourth Army, with the help of local communist militias, launched their assault in the Houmajia region of Lingbi County of Anhui, China, after the nationalist 33rd Division guarding the region refused to surrender. The nationalist 33rd Division was the former nationalists turned Japanese puppet regime force rejoined nationalist after World War II, and they were ordered by Chiang Kai-shek’s regime to hold on the land they controlled, and not to surrender to the communists, and fight off communists if necessary until Chiang could deploy his own troops to the region, and the 15th Brigade, 16th Brigade, and the 25th Brigade of the nationalist 33rd Division were assigned to station outside the city wall. After fierce fights, the nationalist front collapsed as the casualties exceeded over a thousand, and the demoralized nationalists gave up the fight and fled to the town of Lingbi County, seeking shelter behind the city wall, and thus leaving vast rural area to the enemy. Lacking heavy weaponry, the communists chose not to attack the strongly defended town and did not pursuit the retreating nationalists, but instead, decided to consolidate their gains in the newly conquered rural territory, and the battle concluded.

Outcome

Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the warlords in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the warlord problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalilsts for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened popular resentment against Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime. DVD